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OF THE STATE OF UT^H 
VERLA H. CARTER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
MS 
GERALD 111. CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case arose as a petition tlo modify the alimony 
obligation of the defendant pursuant to qn existing Decree of 
Div/orce* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The hearing on the Petition for modification occurred 
on January 14, 1976. Judge Joseph Harlon Burns of the Fifth 
Judicial District denied defendants Petition to modify the 
Div/orce Decree to reduce alimony from $200.OU dollars per month 
to $1011.QU dollars per month* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant is seeking a reversal of Judge 
Burns Order denying the Petition for modification of the Divorce 
Decree* The plaintiff-respondent urges affirmance of Judge 
Burns Order* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 12th day of June, 1973, t^ he plaintiff was 
awarded a Decree of Div/orce from the defehdant. At that time, 
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the Court ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff 
$200.UU dollars per month as alimony. The defendant sub-
sequently filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree to 
reduce the alimony from $20U.QU dollars per month to $100.00 
dollars per month. The defendant allege^, as grounds for 
the modification, that he had incurred additional obligations, 
that his yearly income had been reduced, that his health had 
impaired his earning capacity, and that the pl8intifffs 
needs had been reduced. 
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PQINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
In hearings on Petitions to Modify Divorce Decrees, 
trial courts have traditionally been giv&n a great deal of 
discretion. The trial court is granted its power to hear 
this type of Petition in Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3^5, 
which provides, in pertinent part, as foilows: 
"The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders with respect 
to the support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and main-
tenance, or the distribution of the property as shall 
be reasonable and necessary..." 
The trial court's discretion, however, is not without limit. 
The party seeking a modification of the cjivorce decree h8s 
the burden of proving a change in circumstances which would 
warrant such modification. Osmus v. Osmus|, Utah, 198 P.2d 
233 (194b), Gale v. Gale, Utah, 2bB P.2d 986 (19b3), Klein v. 
Klein, Utah, b44 P.2d 472 (19/5, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 2U 
Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d IbO (1968), Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 
87, 47b P.2d 1021 (197U). 
In Osmus v. Osmus, supra, the Supreme Court stated: 
"It is a principle now firmly established in this 
jurisdiction that to entitle either party to modi-
fication of a decree of alimony or support money, 
that such party plead and prove a change in 
circumstances such as to require, in fairness 
and equity, a change in the terms of the decree." 
Uihether or not the defendant has met this burden is a matter 
for the decision of the trial court in hi? sound discretion. 
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In deciding whether the defendant has met this burden, 
the trial court must consider many factors related to the 
financial condition of the defendant and plaintiff. No one 
factor is controlling, but all are considered in making this 
determination. 
A reduction in the defendant's income has alwey been 
considered an important factor. However, many cases have been 
decided wherein a reduction in income ha$ been held to be en 
insufficient ground for modification in light of other circums-
tances. In looking at defendants income, the courts of Utah 
8nd other states hav/e preferred to consider earning capacity 
rather than actual income. In a recent Pennsylvania case, it 
was held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting 
a reduction in alimony even though the husband's income had 
reduced from $3U,U0U.QQ to $lb,00U.UQ per year where it was 
shown that the husband's financial condition still allowed him 
to pay the alimony. There the cuurt said, "The court has the 
power and duty to look beyond the actual earnings of the parties, 
and may consider his earning power, and the nature and extent 
of his property and other financial resources.M Shuster v. 
Shuster, 226 Pa.Super. b42,323 A.2d 76U (1974). In Osmus v. 
Osmus, supra, the husbands income had been drastically reduced, 
yet the court held that his earning capacity was still sufficient 
to pay the required amount of alimony. I|n Ridge v. Ridge, Utah, 
542 P.2d 189 (197b), the Supreme Court held that a reduction in 
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income from $32,000.00 per year to 23,000.1)0 per year was sufficien 
to justify a reduction in slimony from $62b.00 per month to 
J5UU.UU per month. The Court felt that a person with an 
income of $23,U00.00 could only afford alimony of $5U0.UU 
per month. In the case at bar, the defendant with 6n income 
of $21,000.00 was only required to pay $200.00 per month alimony. 
If the Supreme Court felt that a person with an income of 
$23,000.00 could pay $500.00 per month along with his many other 
obligations, it logieeliy follows that a person with $12,000.00 
income, as in this case, should be able to pay $2b0.00 per 
month alimony. It also follows that the defendant in this case 
is capable of paying $200.00 per month on his income of $12,000.00 
per year and should not therefore be granted a reduction in 
alimony to $100.00 per month. 
Another factor often considered in determining a 
defendant's financial condition is his incursion of other 
responsibilities and debts. The fact that the defendant has 
remarried goes only to his ability to pay. The defendant has 
failed to prove that his remarriage has wprsened his financial 
condition to such Bn extent as to warrant a reduction in alimony. 
The debts which the defendant has incurred since the date of 
the divorce decree have been for the most part to establish 
the defendants venture into the cattle business. These debts 
will not hamper the defendants ability to pay, but, considering 
the defendants expertise with cattle, should enhance his financial 
situation. 
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Another factor to be considered by the trial court 
is the impairment of the defendants health since the Decree of 
Divorce. The defendant has shown only that his health problem 
has required him to refrain from riding certain types of 
construction equipment. However, he is capable of other 
profitable types of work, for instance, welding, farming end 
running cattle. The impairment of health or physical condition 
does not automatically require a modification if the husband 
is able to comply with the decree. See Young v. Young, 262 
Ala. 2b4, 78 So. 2d 26b (19bb) and Altenbach, 162 S.111.2d 361 
(fflo. 1942). The defendant in this case has failed to prove to 
the satisfaction of the trial court that the impairment of his 
health would result in the inability to comply with the decree. 
The trial court in a hearing of this kind should also 
consider the needs of the plaintiff. The defendant has alleged 
that the plaintiff's ten acres of land should yield J2UU.0Q 
per acre for a net income of $2,1)00.00. However, the defendant 
has 3b acres of lend which by the same token could yield $7,000.00 
per year if managed properly. At any rate, the defendant has 
failed to prove that the plaintiffs financial needs have changed 
sufficiently to warrant a reduction in alimony. 
The defendant failed to prove to the trial court that 
there had been a substantial and material reduction in his 
ability to pay the required alimony. Considering all the factors 
involved, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the trial 
court abused its discretion in the slightest manner* In light 
of the failure to prov/e an impairment of the defendant's ability 
to comply u/ith the Divorce Decree, a reduction in the amount 
of alimony mould have been an abuse of the trial courts discretion* 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE UPHELD IN ABSENCE OF A 
SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. 
It is an established principle of law that a trial 
court's decision will be upheld unless there is a showing that 
the decision was clearly erroneous or was an abuse of discretion. 
IKlacDonald v. IKlacDonald, Utah, 236 P.2d 1U66 (19bl), Knighton v. 
Knighton, lb Utah 2d bb, 3B7 P.2d 91 (1963), fflcKeen v/. mcKean, 
Utah, b44 P.2d 123B (197b). Since the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, but decided properly considering ell the 
facts, the decision of the trial court should be upheld. 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENT ADMISSION OF PRIOR TESTIMONY WAS 
PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The defendant has alleged that the trial Judge considered 
prior testimony of the defendant in another matter in making 
his decision in this case. In the hearing involving the 
estate of George Ul. Hunter over which Judge Burns presided, 
the defendant testified that he uies a competent cattlemen end 
that he was capable of running cattle under lease to the estate. 
In the hearing on the petition for modification, Judge Burnsv 
in fulfilling his judicial duty of bringing out the truth, asked 
the defendant if he had not previously testified to being a 
competent cattlemen in the hearing on the estate. The defendant 
in the hearing admitted to having made such a statement (See 
transcript page 43, lines 19-27). The trial Judge could and 
did properly consider that admission in his decision to deny 
the petition for modification of the divorce decree. The 
defendants admission took place within the hearing and was 
itself evidence which could be considered. The defendant's 
prior admission was never placed in evidence end was never 
necessary to the cuurt's decision. The fact that the Judge 
asked the question based upon his knowledge of the prior 
proceedings, does not necessitate a finding that the Judge 
considered the evidence presented in the prior proceeding in 
his decision in the hearing. The following cases hold that 
judicial admission are evidence against the party who made them 
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see: Schucking v. Young, 7d Ore. 483, lb3 P. 803, and 
Oregon Short Line R. Co. v/s. Blyth, 19 UJyo. 41U, lib P. 649. 
The Judge is presumed to ha\/e decided th© hearing based upon 
the defendant's present admission absent proof to the contrary. 
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CQNCLUSION 
The Trial court's order denying the defendant's 
petition to modify the Decree of Divorce was properly 
decided uiithin the sound discretion of the trial court. 
The plaintiff, therefore, urges affirmance of the trial 
court's order denying the petition to modify. 
Respondent respectfully submit that the decision and 
judgment of the court below should be affirmed with costs to 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Dave IKlcfflullin, 
Attorney for Respondent 
